Financial
Empire may have reduced us all to debt prisoners, but we can still
become the social protagonists of history’s greatest-ever prison break.
Let
there be no doubt about it: we live in the era of Financial Empire.
Unlike the military conquests that drove the territorial expansions of
the empires of old, contemporary Financial Empire consists not in the
highly visible exercise of a Big Stick ideology (although military imperialism undoubtedly continues today), but rather takes the shape of an Invisible Hand.
Where in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the logic of domination
was driven by the instrumental power of imperial states, the Empire of
the 21st century no longer needs any sticks to enforce the submission of
sovereign states: through the global enforcement mechanisms of market
discipline and IMF conditionality, the structural power of finance
capital now ensures that all shall bow before the money markets.
In The Accumulation of Capital (1913), Rosa Luxemburg noted that,
“though foreign loans are indispensable for the emancipation of rising
capitalist states, they are yet the surest ties by which the old
capitalist states maintain their influence, exercise financial control
and exert pressure on the customs, foreign and commercial policy of the
young capitalist states.” So great was this financial control that in
the First Wave of Globalization, which ran from 1870 until the onset of
WWI in 1914, defaulting countries faced a 40 percent chance
of being invaded, subjected to gunboat diplomacy, or having foreign
control imposed on their domestic finances under threat of a naval
blockade. In a telling and ironic sign of the times, even the Hague
Peace Conference of 1906 recognized the legitimacy of the use of force in settling sovereign debt disputes.
Enforcing Debtor Discipline: the Era of Gunboat Diplomacy
The
late 19th and early 20th century logic of imperialism thus took a
military form that ultimately relied upon the instrumental power of the
imperial states themselves. In 1882, for instance, following the Urabi revolt in
Egypt, which had just deposed the French and British administrators who
had taken control of Egypt’s finances in the wake of the 1870s debt
crisis, Britain summarily invaded the country and incorporated it into
the British Empire as a protectorate. Fast-forward some 130 years, and
we have the foreign administrators of the IMF moving in
on the heels of yet another popular uprising to make sure that Egypt
does not default on its debts to Western banks. Today’s creditors no
longer need to resort to the military force of their own governments to
enforce their loan contracts: as a global disciplinarian, the IMF will
do it for them.
The Ottoman Empire
similarly defaulted in the 1870s, and although it was still powerful
enough to withstand an outright European invasion, the Turkish
government had to submit itself to a humiliating agreement with its
foreign creditors: a Council of Foreign Bondholders,
made up of representatives of the largest European banks, took control
over its tax and customs offices. According to one member of the
Council, Edgar Vincent, “There is no instance in which powers so
extended have been granted to a foreign organization in a Sovereign
state.” Fast-forward 130 years once more, and Turkey yet again finds
itself in dire straits financially. The IMF is called upon in 1998 and
thoroughly restructures the economy, marginalizing millions of poor
Turks and leaving the Bretton Woods Project to conclude that, “over its long decade with the IMF, Turkey managed to replace public deficits with a democracy deficit.”
In
1898, Greece also fell under foreign financial control after defaulting
on the debts it accrued during its war with Turkey. Mitchener and
Weidenmier recount
that, “As terms of the peace treaty, European powers were given
authority to assume the administration of revenues on behalf of existing
creditors and to effectuate payment of the war indemnity.” The
historical parallels between the Greek debt crisis of 1898 and the one
of today are striking. Since Germany had been the “major player in
arranging the protection of foreign bondholders’ interests” in 1898, “it
was given authority by the other European countries to come to terms
with Greece about the operation and control over Greek finance as well
as the terms of the debt settlement.” These terms were laid out in a new
law; but, as Mitchener and Weidenmier stress, the approval of this law —
just like today’s austerity memorandum — “was a sovereign act in
appearance only.”
A few years later,
in 1902, President Cipriano Castro of Venezuela refused to compensate
European investors for the losses they made during the revolutionary
upheaval that had brought him to power. The creditor response was swift
and decisive: for four months, German, British and Italian gunboats
shelled Venezuela’s coastal defenses and blockaded its main ports in
order to force Castro to repay the debt in full. Two years later,
largely in response to this blatant display of European imperialism in
the Western hemisphere, President Theodore Roosevelt announced his
infamous Roosevelt corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine, which held that — rather than having the European
powers messing around in its backyard — the US would now enforce the
legitimate debt contracts of European financiers in Latin America and
the Caribbean itself. Announcing his new foreign policy doctrine,
Roosevelt issued a thinly veiled threat to his neighbors: “If a nation
shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in
social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its
obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States.”
A
year later, in 1905, US Marines invaded the Dominican Republic after it
tried to default on its debts, taking over the country’s customs
revenues to ensure full repayment to private bondholders. Nicaragua
befell a similar fate in 1911-’12. Fast-forward another couple of
decades, to 1982, and the United States is once again mingling in the
sovereign affairs of its Latin American neighbors, sending in
the IMF and World Bank on behalf of powerful private creditors. In
Venezuela, seven years of IMF-sanctioned austerity measures eventually
reach a dramatic apotheosis in the massive Caracazo protests
of February 27, 1989, in which hundreds of thousands demonstrate
against cuts in fuel and food subsidies that are part of the
government’s agreement with the IMF. This time around, instead of having
to fall back onto the gunboats of the US government, Wall Street
bankers can rely fully on the internalized debtor discipline of the
Venezuelan government: security forces open fire on the protesters and
kill over 3,000 people. The debt, of course, is largely repaid.
Enforcing Debtor Discipline in the Era of Financial Empire
Today,
the imperial era of gunboat diplomacy may have come to
an ignominious end, but the era of Financial Empire is still in full
swing. What the ongoing European debt crisis confirms once more is that
financial capitalism, once fully developed and globalized, has no need
for debtors’ prisons, gunboat diplomacy or US marines to enforce debtor
discipline. The iron bars of the debtors’ prison are replaced with the
global flows of finance capital; the gunboats have long since made way
for what Warren Buffet called the financial weapons of mass destruction;
and the foreign administrators of tax and customs offices no longer
wear military suits but carry IMF suitcases. Through its control over
capital flows and its ability to withhold much-needed credit, the global
bankers’ alliance (made up of the big banks and institutional
investors, along with international financial institutions and the
financial and monetary authorities of the dominant capitalist states)
has obtained a form of structural power that allows it to discipline the
behavior of indebted countries without having to resort to military
coercion. It is this discipline enforced by global capital markets and
financial institutions that forms the backbone of Financial Empire.
When talking about Empire, Hardt and Negri remind us,
we should not be fooled into thinking that we are referring to a
metaphor. It is not that the abolition of Greek monetary and fiscal
sovereignty is somehow reminiscent of the Nazi invasion, as both
left-wing and right-wing protesters in Greece seem to claim;
unfortunately, the reality is both more complex and more subversive than
that. Rather than falling into the trap of making simple historical
allegories between the territorial empires of old and the Financial
Empire of today, we should conceive of Empire as a concept; a
concept which, in Hardt and Negri’s words, “is characterized
fundamentally by a lack of boundaries.” In this sense, the rule of
Financial Empire — unlike that of the Third Reich or the British Empire —
has no limits. Unlike Nazi troops or British navy vessels, finance
capital cannot simply be expelled from Greece’s sovereign territory.
Rather than posing a territorial threat to national sovereignty as an
occupying force, Financial Empire dissolves the notion of
national sovereignty altogether by subverting the power base and popular
legitimacy upon which the modern state ultimately depends: its ability
to direct the flow of capital through monetary and fiscal policy.
To
an extent, capital always-already operated beyond the boundaries of the
modern nation state. As Marx and Engels observed in the Communist Manifesto,
“The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given
a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every
country.” But with the resurgence of global finance from 1973 onward,
the state’s structural dependence on globally-mobile capital has been
greatly increased. The state, which continues to exist in its
territorial realm, is gradually stripped of its ability to control the
de-territorialized flows of investment upon which it relies for its
continued existence. As a result, Subcomandante Marcos, who in 1994 led
the Zapatista uprising against the Mexican state — which had by that
point become fully incorporated into Financial Empire – poetically remarked that,
“in the cabaret of globalization, the state appears as a table dancer
that strips off everything until it is left with only the minimum
indispensable garments: the repressive force.” Thus the creditors’ need
to exercise physical repression is greatly reduced: by stripping down
the state and exposing its naked essence of institutionalized violence,
the process of globalization serves to internalize debtor discipline
into the state apparatus, rendering state managers structurally
subservient to the logic of global capital.
In 1982, with the structural power of capital firmly on the rise following the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime, the American political scientist Charles Lindblom wrote a controversial article in the Journal of Politics
in which he compared the market to a prison. By allowing private
investors to withhold much-needed capital from the state and the
economy, Lindblom observed, the market effectively functions as a
disciplinary mechanism for state managers: you want to raise
environmental standards? You’ll have to take into account the impact on
business investment — and thus on jobs and your approval rating as a
politician. Want to regulate the financial sector? You’ll have to worry
about big banks simply moving their assets to another country. Want to
raise taxes on the wealthy? You’ll have to consider the fact that your
famous movie stars might move to Russia.
Whatever you want to do as a politician, as soon as you’re in power,
the first thing you have to contend with are business interests, and the
punishments businessmen can bring to bear by withholding investment if
they don’t like your policies. Most remarkably, Lindblom noted, “this
punishment is not dependent on conspiracy or intention to punish …
Simply minding one’s own business is the formula for an extraordinary
system for repressing change.”
Lindblom’s
notion of the market as prison can easily be extended to the global
capital markets of today. As Robert Kuttner recently put it in his review of David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5,000 Years,
“entire economies abroad, indentured to past debts, find themselves in a
metaphoric debtors’ prison where they can neither repay creditors nor
resume productive livelihoods.” Similarly, financial lawyer Ross Buckley
has written that
“we still have something very like debtors’ prisons for highly indebted
nations.” As we saw in Greece and Italy in 2011, the automatic
disciplinary mechanism of global capital markets ultimately serves to
undermine democratic procedures, replacing them with technocratic
administration. In the process, politicians are reduced to the role of
temporary managers of the state apparatus in the name of
financial capital; an arrangement that is ultimately much more
convenient and much less costly to the global bankers’ alliance than
sending in gunboats or physically occupying a country. In this sense,
today’s Financial Empire is really not just a metaphor: it is the
culmination of capitalist development into the perfected form of
imperialism — one that hardly requires any bloodshed on the part of
capital while still ensuring a massive upwards wealth redistribution
from the poor to the rich.
We Are All Debt Prisoners Now
But
for some, even the overwhelming structural power of finance capital
does not appear to be good enough. Even though default has already been
ruled out a priori as a “legitimate” policy option in the
management of international debt crises, there are still voices going up
for further intervention into the sovereign affairs of indebted
countries. In the wake of Argentina’s 2001 default, for instance, MIT
economists Ricardo Caballero and Rudi Dornbusch argued
that “Argentina cannot be trusted” and “Somebody has to run the country
with a tight grip.” Stopping short of promoting an outright
CIA-assisted military coup — the preferred solution of US-based capital
throughout the Cold War era — the authors suggested that “Argentina now
must give up much of its monetary, fiscal, regulatory and asset
management sovereignty for an extended period, say five years,” and
allow foreign commissioners to take over financial management of the
country. “Specifically,” they stressed, “a board of experienced foreign
central bankers should take control of Argentina’s monetary policy.”
Similarly,
Mitchener and Weidenmier, two economists who went to great lengths to
emphasize the efficacy of military coercion in deterring sovereign debt
default between 1870 and 1913, suggest
that today “some type of fiscal or monetary control by an external
financial committee may impose needed discipline on recalcitrant
debtors.” One prominent conservative commentator on the Latin American
debt crisis of the 1980s, whose book was notably praised by IMF Managing
Director Jacques De Larosière, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker,
and leading banker Charles Dallara, even went so far as to propose
the somewhat frightening notion that “gunboats are the borrowers’ best
friend.” Not surprisingly, similar calls for the abolition of fiscal
sovereignty are being echoed in European policy-making circles today. In
2011, for instance, one leading member of Angela Merkel’s conservative
party argued
that “Greece must give up something, like some of its national
sovereignty — at least temporarily,” to allow private creditors to be
fully repaid.
During the negotiations between Greece and its private creditors last year, Larry Elliot, the economics editor of The Guardian, rightly observed
that, even though “the warships have been replaced by spreadsheets …
the Troika’s gunboats will [still] get their way.” The real pressure, he
observed, now “comes from banks, hedge funds and the team of officials
of the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the
EU.” Perhaps, then, we are not as far from the imperial era as we would
like to think — and while the use of military force may be considered
off bounds today, its real absence is not just the result of some
enlightened liberal morality but rather a product of the high costs of
military intervention compared to the much more effective methods of
financial interventionism that replaced it. Even though one-third of US states still
allow citizens to be imprisoned for failure to repay their debts, the
general tendency in Financial Empire has been to move away from the
direct exercise of punishment towards more structural forms of
domination. In this sense, debtors’ prison is no longer just a physical
place where “recalcitrant debtors” are locked away from the rest of
society; it has become a de-territorialized disciplinary mechanism that
encompasses the globe as a whole. We are all debt prisoners now.
Luckily,
the structural power of finance capital can never be complete. In fact,
those who are willing to take a closer look can already see the cracks in the prison walls –
some of them made by the countless escape attempts of the prisoners
themselves, as they desperately try to break their way out; others
caused simply by the inability of the global financial architecture to
support the unbearable weight of the debt load that states, firms and
households have accrued over the years. As Lindblom himself importantly
stressed, wherever there are prisons, there will also be prison breaks,
and the crumbling system of market discipline that sustains Financial
Empire is clearly far from escape-proof. The Argentine experience of
2001 is a case in point. While there is no need to romanticize
Argentina’s widely-discussed default — rather than a revolutionary act
of defiance, it was simply a desperate (and successful) populist attempt
by the established Peronist elite to cling on to power in the face of
massive social unrest — the most important lesson to emerge from
Argentina is that, in the face of a spontaneous and sustained popular
uprising, even the strongest walls will eventually cave in.
Indeed, Financial Empire may have reduced us all to modern-day debt prisoners, but we can still become the social protagonists
of history’s greatest-ever prison break — as long as we draw the right
lessons from the long history of imperial domination that led us to this
defining point in human history.
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