The
IMF’s self-admitted errors in the Greek bailout were not just
“mistakes”: they were the deliberate reproduction of a classical
ideological script.
Editor’s note:
We apologize to those subscribed to the ROAR mailing list — due to a
“mistake” in our content management system our daily email of today
accidentally shared an unfinished version of this article.
Three
years since its first bailout, the IMF has finally gathered the courage
to admit that it made major mistakes in its handling of the Greek debt
crisis. In an official report
released last week, the Fund states that, while its basic policy
prescriptions were correct, it underestimated the negative effect of
austerity on growth and therefore ended up making economic prognoses
that were much too optimistic about Greece’s debt sustainability. Where
the IMF predicted a contraction of 5.5% of economic output between 2009
and 2012, the Greek economy actually lost 17%, and where the IMF
predicted 15% unemployment by 2012, the actual rate was 25%. So much for
the supposed neoliberal “success story” of draconian austerity that
European leaders have been raving about in their delirious collective debt delusion.
And
yet, while these seemingly shocking admissions hit media headlines as
if they were some kind of profound revelation, the sad truth is that
they actually tell us nothing new. In fact, the Greek Labour Institute
and the think tank IOVE made forecasts
that were frighteningly close to the actual outcome. The IMF now argues
that Greece should have had debt cancellation as early as 2010 or 2011,
but claims that this policy response was politically unpalatable to
those countries — i.e., Germany, France and the Netherlands — whose
banks had a large exposure to Greek debt. Again, this is nothing new:
the IMF is merely repeating the exact argument that hundreds of thousands
of outraged Greeks made in 2011, when they occupied Syntagma Square to
contest a parliamentary vote on the EU/IMF-imposed austerity memorandum.
Back then, the protesters were dismissed as fringe extremists. Now even
the IMF proves them right.
But there is another — more sinister — way in which the IMF’s belated mea culpa
is nothing new. The fact of the matter is that these type of
self-critical reports by the Fund have been a permanent feature of its
management of international financial crises ever since the 1980s. For
some reason, every time a debt crisis strikes, the IMF moves in to
impose the same short-sighted bailouts, austerity measures and market
reforms — and then, several years later, comes to the conclusion that it
made major mistakes in its handling of the crisis. Yet it never changes
tack: when the next crisis hits, it simply reproduces the same old
script: stabilization, privatization, liberalization. Nothing else will
do to satisfy the markets, and so the debtors simply have to bend over
backwards to satisfy the orthodox neoliberal prescriptions of structural
adjustment.
During the Latin
American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Fund also made overly optimistic
growth prognoses in a context of austerity. Back then, these predictions
also served to legitimate a policy response that narrowly served the
interests of the big banks by preventing early debt write-downs. Just as
today, the IMF was also forced to admit — in hindsight — that it
“failed to foresee” the depth and duration of the crisis. As official
IMF historian James Boughton noted in his extensive study
of thirty years of IMF crisis management, the Fund suffered from a
“lack of foresight [resulting] from optimism in assessing the growth
prospects of Latin American countries.” Indeed, its austerity programs
“were predicated on forecasts of a rapid resumption of economic growth”
that failed to materialize. This led Karen Lissakers, a future IMF
executive director, to conclude that “the Fund is acting as enforcer of the banks’ loan contracts.”
None
of that, however, stopped the Fund from imposing even harsher policy
conditionality on the Asian tigers when these countries descended into
crisis in the late 1990s. During the East-Asian crisis, the IMF once
again came under fire for its imposition of austerity and market reforms
that seemed to go way beyond — and even directly against — its
institutional mandate to safeguard international financial stability. In
his best-selling book Globalization and its Discontents,
Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank during the crisis,
publicly lambasted the IMF for its disastrous insistence on austerity.
In a 1999 report, the Fund concluded
that “its policy prescriptions towards South Korea, Indonesia and
Thailand were correct, but there was a crucial flaw: the IMF assumed its
programmes would rapidly restore market confidence, and they did not.”
This led even the conservative free-trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati to chide
the Fund for its counterproductive approach to crisis management,
arguing that the IMF now worked solely in the interest of the large Wall
Street banks.
If these wholesale
economic collapses and the consequent destruction of the livelihoods of
millions of Latin American and Asian citizens were truly just
“mistakes”, resulting from faulty baseline assumptions and flawed
econometric modelling, one would expect an international institution
staffed by hundreds of Ivy League and Oxbridge PhDs to eventually learn
from these mistakes and come up with a somewhat more credible
alternative. Wrong. Following the 2001-’02 Argentine financial crisis,
the Fund once again admitted
to making a series of “mistakes” of historic proportions, culminating
into the largest sovereign debt default in world history. As former IMF
managing director Michel Camdessus recently recalled,
“we probably made many silly mistakes and committed errors with
Argentina.” As a result, 60 percent of Argentinians fell into poverty as
the country experienced the deepest economic depression in its history.
Over the past thirty years, the world has experienced over a hundred
financial crises. So far, the IMF has responded to practically every
single one of them with the same defunct policy prescription of rapid
fiscal contraction, firesale privatizations and far-reaching neoliberal
market reforms. In the vast majority of cases, this orthodox policy
response contributed to a deepening of the recession, the loss of
millions of jobs, and a humanitarian tragedy of unspeakable proportions.
If you make the same mistake a hundred times over, can it still be
considered a mistake? Or are we looking at the deliberate reproduction
of an ideological script that narrowly serves the interests of private
creditors by shifting the burden of adjustment squarely onto the
shoulders of the poorest and weakest members in the debtor countries?
Seen in this light, the IMF’s penchant for erroneous forecasting seems like a costly mistake indeed. A recent study
by economist David Stuckler and epidemiologist Sanjay Basu, based on a
wealth of statistical evidence, finds that “austerity kills”. Finding
dramatic increases in suicide rates, HIV infections and a renewed
malaria outbreak in Greece, the authors conclude
that “many countries have turned their recessions into veritable
epidemics, ruining or extinguishing thousands of lives in a misguided
attempt to balance budgets and shore up financial markets.” Even if we
assumed that the IMF’s policy prescriptions were based on mere
“mistakes”, such mistakes must have consequences. At the very least,
those responsible for the mistakes should lose their jobs and
reputations. A genuinely democratic state of law, however, would require
such mass manslaughter to be punishable by law — with long-term
imprisonment.
But despite the repeated admission of its mistakes, no one at the Fund has ever lost a job
for prescribing deadly austerity measures. No IMF chief or economist
has ever been jailed for directly imposing — or at least justifying —
the type of policies that literally kill thousands of people and destroy
the lives of millions more. And of course they haven’t. After all, the
issue here is not with responsibility but with legitimacy. When it
admits to its mistakes, the IMF is not taking responsibility for its
actions; it is merely trying to convince the world that it is serious
about economic “science”, that it recognizes the fact that its own
policies failed due to flawed econometric modeling — only to repeat
those very same policies all over again when systemic “necessity”
demands it in the next debt crisis. The admissions of its mistakes are
part of the same ideological smokescreen that led the IMF to impose
dramatic austerity from Mexico to Thailand, and from Argentina to
Greece. They are meaningless.
In this
particular case, the IMF also has obvious ulterior motives behind the
release of its seemingly self-critical report. As Greek economist Yannis
Varoufakis points out,
“the IMF economists are considering an exit from the Troika and are now
paving the path for it.” The reason the IMF wants to exit the Troika is
simple: it wants to save face from a policy response that it itself
helped to impose but that is now clearly starting to fall apart. In a
way, the Fund was simply the first to jump ship, once again shifting
responsibility onto others in order to preserve its own legitimacy. It
now blames the European Commission for its lack of experience with
crisis management, while blaming France and Germany for obstructing an
earlier restructuring of Greek debt. But the truth remains that the IMF
has — on virtually every occasion since 1982 — vehemently opposed such
debt restructurings itself, while showing remarkably little aptitude at
crisis management as such.
Perhaps, then, we should see the IMF’s mea culpa
in a radically different light. Perhaps these are not just mistakes but
simply the reproduction of a classical ideological script — one which
needs to be re-legitimized from time to time by providing at least the illusion of scientific rigor and institutional humility. Yannis Varoufakis is therefore wrong to argue
that Southern Europe should now team up with the IMF to contest the
austerity drive of the North. It is time to stop listening to the empty
rhetoric of the IMF and start looking at its actions: if the past thirty
years of its wrongheaded crisis management have revealed anything, it
is that the Fund — despite its eventual self-critique — will always
remain “the enforcer of the banks’ loan contracts”, and therefore an
extremely unreliable partner for those who remain stuck in the debt
trap.
No comments:
Post a Comment